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PLAYING WITH THE RULES 
Mark V. Tushnet* 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE. By Frederick 
Schauer. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 254. 
$39.95. 
What exactly do rules do? The conventional answer, which Pro-
fessor Frederick Schauer1 challenges in Playing by the Rules, is: Not 
very much. Rules do so little because, while people adopt them to 
accomplish something (the "purpose" of the rules), the rules are al-
ways either over- or underinclusive with respect to their purposes. A 
rule is overinclusive when it directs someone to do something that 
does not promote, and might even inhibit, that rule's purposes. Ap-
plying an overinclusive rule is inefficient, imposing the costs of com-
plying with the rule yet failing to advance the rule's purposes.2 If a 
transit authority excludes all drug users, including those who use 
methadone, from jobs on the subway to promote safety, and it turns 
out that the methadone users pose no more risk than anyone else, the 
transit authority is raising its own costs of operation without getting 
anything in return. 3 A rule is underinclusive when it fails to direct 
someone to do something that does promote its purposes. Underinclu-
sive rules are, qua rules, 4 presumptively unfair, because nothing distin-
guishes the underlying case to which the rule is applied from the one 
to which it is not applied. In the previous example, if people with 
diabetes happen to pose a greater risk to safety than methadone users, 
then excluding the latter from jobs available to the former, in the name 
of safety, is unfair. 
One's natural reaction, when confronted with a case in which a 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, M.A. 1971, 
Yale.-Ed. 
1. Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. 
2. The conventional account of rules takes into account the possibility that applying the rule 
in these circumstances might be efficient if the cost of deciding whether or not to apply the rule 
exceeds the cost of applying it. This is what Schauer describes as "rules as rules of thumb,'' and 
he properly notes that it does not get at the fundamental ruleness of rules. 
3. The example is drawn from New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
The analysis gets more complicated, but does not otherwise change, if the authority claims that 
its purpose is to promote safety in a cost-justified way. 
4. The qualification is necessary because underinclusive rules rarely bar a decisionmaker 
from advancing the rule's purpose with respect to someone or something not covered by the rule; 
they merely do not require the decisionmaker to do so. 
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rule is over- or underinclusive with respect to its purposes, is to ignore 
the rule and invoke the purposes directly. Then, however, the rule 
does no work at all. It is, as David Lyons has argued in connection 
with rule-utilitarianism, extensionally equivalent to its purposes. 5 
That is, the rule consists entirely in the invocation of its purposes in 
particular cases. At most, the rule is a shorthand guide, a summary of 
judgments about what is most likely to advance those purposes. But, 
given a rational argument that applying the rule would not advance its 
purposes, it will not do for a decisionmaker to say: "Well, the rule 
says it applies, and I'm going to apply it without further considera-
tion." Rather, the decisionmaker ought to consider the merits of the 
rational argument: if persuaded that applying the rule would not ad-
vance its purposes, she ought not apply it. 
Schauer argues, against this conventional view, that rules really do 
something. The mistaken conventional view, Schauer argues, fails to 
distinguish between those who articulate rules and those who apply 
them. Schauer concedes the accuracy of the conventional view only if 
the very person who has articulated the rule - and who therefore 
knows its precise purposes and has full confidence in her own ability to 
determine how to advance them - will apply it. But rules are most 
often directed from one person to another. And, Schauer argues, if the 
rule-articulator, whom I will call Susan, believes that the rule-applier, 
whom I will call Sylvester, will less accurately promote the rule's pur-
poses if Sylvester attempts to analyze and apply the rule's purposes 
directly than if he simply invokes the rule, the rule will do some work. 
As Schauer puts it: "If we do not trust a decision-maker to determine 
x, then we can hardly trust that decision-maker to determine that this 
is a case in which the reasons for disabling that decisionmaker from 
determining x either do not apply or are outweighed" (p. 98). 
Rules promote accurate outcomes by preempting Sylvester's in-
quiry into whether applying the rule would actually advance the rule's 
purposes. The inefficiency of overinclusiveness and the unfairness of 
underinclusiveness are offset, under this scenario, because Sylvester 
will never fail to apply the rule where doing so would in fact -
although Sylvester believes otherwise - advance the rule's purposes. 
Before assessing Schauer's argument, I must enter a disclaimer. 
Schauer has written a serious work in the philosophy of law and lan-
guage, which can most fully be evaluated by specialists in those fields. 
Although I am not such a specialist, 6 I can bring to Schauer's work 
the perspective of a law professor interested in jurisprudence, and par-
ticularly in the implications of jurisprudence for constitutional law. 
Although the limitations of my perspective deserve mention, I also 
5. DAVID LYONS, TuE FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965). 
6. I should also note that I regard myself as one of Schauer's friends, and so may be more 
tempered in my judgments, more charitable in my presumptions, than I might otherwise be. 
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believe that Schauer's work is likely to be assimilated into mainstream 
U.S. law precisely by people like me, rather than by specialists in the 
philosophy of law and language. My quibbles, criticisms, and mis-
takes, therefore, can suggest what the "social" meaning of Schauer's 
work might be over the next few years. Further, as befits a writer in 
the analytic tradition, Schauer takes great care to be as precise as he 
can in his formulations. As a result, it would take an extended analy-
sis and argument to unpack what he has to say about many collateral 
points. Fortunately for me, those collateral points do not adhere con-
ceptually to Schauer's central argument about the practice of rule-fol-
lowing, and I believe it appropriate to leave discussion of most of the 
collateral points to others. 1 . 
Schauer's basic argument turns on distinguishing between Susan, 
the rule-articulator, and Sylvester, the rule-applier. Two related 
problems atjse from that distinction. Schauer argues that rules do 
something when Susan, and not Sylvester, can better discern when ap-
plying the rule will advance the rule's purposes. 8 In Schauer's core 
image, a judge articulates a rule to be applied by a police officer on the 
beat. Some police officers might be better than some judges at deter-
mining whether the purposes of the constitutional rules limiting police 
investigatory techniques would be promoted by refraining from using 
one such technique in the circumstances at hand. But, Schauer sug-
gests, the typical officer is more likely than the typical judge to make 
errors of over- and underinclusiveness. The typical officer will mistak-
enly believe in a high probability of discovering a crime in progress, 
while the typical judge, knowing that the probability is relatively low, 
can state a rule directing the officer to refrain from investigating unless 
conditions A, B, and C obtain - conditions that together raise the 
probability to a socially acceptable level. As Schauer says, we take a 
"worst case" or second-best perspective (pp. 152-53), disabling the 
best police officers from exercising their judgment directly so that less 
competent officers will, by following the rule, make the right decision 
more often. In the aggregate, we get a better fit between actions and 
purposes by directing every police officer to follow the rule, although 
in parti~ular cases the best police officer would serve us better by exer-
cising independent judgment. 
Suppose, however, that Sylvester is actually better than Susan at 
figuring out how the rule's purposes will be advanced. The very ab-
stractness of the issues presented to appellate courts, for example, 
7. For example, much of chapter 2 clarifies the distinction between descriptive and prescrip· 
tive rules, and similarly clarifies the notion of rules as probabilistic descriptive generalizations. 
These clarifications are important in some contexts but they are not, I think, central to Schauer's 
main argument. Except when engaged in a particular kind of philosophical argument, of a differ-
ent sort than Schauer's, few people think that legal rules are, in their normative dimension, 
descriptive. 
8. See, e.g. pp. 149-50. 
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might lead judges to overlook relevant information that police officers 
have at their fingertips - information that because of their lack of 
specialized education, officers are less likely to articulate in terms that 
judges find persuasive. 9 Here, two possibilities emerge. First, Susan 
may recognize that Sylvester is better than she. She could then adopt 
a rule for herself that she will always defer to Sylvester's decisions. 
That, however, raises a difficult question. Under what circumstances 
does it make sense for a person to make a rule that purports to bind 
herself in the future? It makes sense, I think, if Susan (a) is unsure 
that she will be able to invoke the rule's purposes directly in the future 
(perhaps because she knows that her judgmental capacities will degen-
erate), and (b) is sure that in the future she would recognize that her 
then-contemporary judgments about what would advance the rule's 
purposes were less accurate than the judgments to which the rule di-
rects her (that is, that she would recognize that her jµdgmental capaci-
ties had degenerated). I am skeptical about the psychological realism 
of this picture. to 
The other possibility introduces a third character, Loretta the leg-
islator. Loretta knows that Sylvester is better than Susan, and there-
fore structures Susan's jurisdiction to keep her from making rules 
binding on Sylvester. At this point, though, a problem of infinite re-
gress looms. We want to make sure that Loretta allocates jurisdiction 
correctly, allowing Susan to make rules where she is better than Syl-
vester, and denying her jurisdiction where Sylvester is better. But, of 
course, the allocation of jurisdiction occurs according to some rule, 
too.1 1 As a result, we now have to worry about the problem that arises 
when Susan is better than Loretta at :figuring out when invoking Su-
san's jurisdiction will promote the purposes of the rules. 
The problem of jurisdiction may not be serious in light of 
Schauer's limited purposes. At the outset of the book, he describes his 
analysis as deliberately "unrealistic" (p. vii). I take that to mean that 
the analysis tries to define a set of conditions that would make "play-
ing by the rules" a coherent practice. Schauer's conditions for coher-
ence are these: (a) Susan is better than Sylvester with respect to 
questions over which she has jririsdiction; (b) Loretta is better than 
Susan with respect to questions of allocating jurisdiction; ( c) and so 
on ad infinitum. Nothing in this argument requires that those condi-
9. I merely note that a certain degree of elitism seems essential to Schauer's argument, be-
yond even the hierarchy of rule-articulator and rule-applier that it obviously requires. 
10. Schauer discusses this intertemporal problem in connection with the issue of precedent 
(pp. 182-87), and in connection with institutions that persist over time with changing personnel 
(pp. 172-74). The discussion of precedent, posing the problem as it arises for Susan at time 2, 
does not, I think, fully address the problem that faces Susan at time 1. The discussion of institu-
tions, while astute, of course does not deal with the psychology of rule-formulation by 
individuals. 
11. Schauer uses the term jurisdiction-apportioning to describe rules. See, e.g., p. 98. 
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tions ever obtain, and indeed Schauer often inserts qualifications 
strongly suggesting that, in his view, the domain in which "playing by 
the rules" is a coherent practice is quite limited.12 Further, nothing in 
the argument requires that anybody ever be able to tell whether or not 
the conditions obtain, which is why the infinite regress is not a prob-
lem for the argument. 
Still, I am bound to wonder about the practical significance of 
Schauer's argument. 13 Once again I find it useful to put the question 
in terms of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rules typically allocate deci-
sions to institutions - courts, police departments, prosecutors' offices, 
legislatures - rather than to individuals. And, while I am confident 
that some individuals are better than others at determining whether 
applying a rule will advance or impede the rule's purposes, I seriously 
doubt whether we can make any systematic judgments about institu-
tions. I for one am not confident that judges, taken as a group, are 
better than police officers or, perhaps more important, police chiefs -
again, taken as a group - at striking the proper balance between my 
right to be protected against depredations by marauding individuals 
and my right to be protected against depredations by marauding police 
officers. 
My lack of confidence occurs because each job requires its holder 
to have a number of talents: the ability to make sound judgments after 
reflection ("applying the law"), the ability to make sound decisions 
quickly ("preserving order"), the ability to discern the reality of events 
beneath the words people use to describe them ("finding facts"), and 
many others. Some people are better than others along all these 
dimensions, but we have no reason to believe that the processes by 
which people are selected for different jobs ensure that only those bet-
ter along all dimensions occupy the superior positions. Some judges 
are better than some police chiefs, but some police chiefs are better 
than some judges. 
Further, the situations in which people are called on to make deci-
sions are so various that we have no reason to believe that the talents 
we measure as a basis for deciding who ought to occupy different jobs 
really do very well to identify those who will make the best decisions 
about the cases they are asked to decide. Police chiefs probably are 
better than judges in setting guidelines about high-speed car chases; 
judges probably are better than police chiefs in setting guidelines about 
using battering rams to get into "drug houses." And, unfortunately, I 
doubt that we really know whether most rules deal with situations 
12. See, e.g., p. 179 ("the aspirations of the common law tend away from ruleness"). 
13. Schauer expresses the "hope" that his analysis can be "returned to its more realistic 
home ... in such a way that the analysis may then help those who study decision-making in 
greater breadth." P. vii. 
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more like car chases or more like battering rams.14 
The general point follows. Suppose that the distribution of skill in 
applying rules solely in light of their purposes is roughly the same 
within every potential rule-applying institution. Then, playing by the 
rules would not be a coherent practice: Susan might be better than 
Sylvester, but all the Susans taken together would not be better than 
all the Sylvesters taken together. Of course, to find out whether this 
was true would require an empirical inquiry of the sort that Schauer 
abjures. 15 
Schauer makes a secondary argument, one that almost inverts the 
first insofar as it requires that he deny that two groups like the Susans 
and the Sylvesters are different. The problem this argument addresses 
is: How does it come about that Sylvester actually is constrained by 
the rule Susan has laid down? Sylvester may follow the rule because 
he is subject to the exercise of social power; if Susan concludes that he 
failed to follow the rule, he will be fired. Then, however, Sylvester is 
not constrained by the rule; he is constrained by social power.16 For 
the rule to constrain, it must have what Schauer calls semantic auton-
omy - "the ability of symbols ... to carry meaning independent of 
the communicative goals on particular occasions of the users of those 
symbols" (p. 55). 
Clearly, to complete the argument, Schauer must establish that se-
mantic autonomy is not derived from social power.17 At this point my 
amateur status disables me from offering more than a modest com-
ment. Consider the possibility that the meaning of words is stabilized 
within communities that are constituted by the exercise of social 
power.18 Within such communities, words have the relevant sort of 
semantic autonomy, and rules (appear to) constrain, but the true 
source of constraint is the social power that constitutes the commu-
nity.19 Schauer marches up to, and then away from, discussing this 
14. I am fairly sure that class-based elitism affects the judgment prevalent among law profes-
sors that judges, taken as a whole, are better along most dimensions than police officers or police 
chiefs. See also supra note 9. 
15. One might ask for a common-sense judgment about the distribution of skills. For what 
it's worth, my sense of things is that police chiefs have a slight advantage over judges with 
respect to the skills relevant to issues of law, order, and civil liberties. Of course, framing the 
inquiry in terms of common sense simply invites us to consider the social sources of common 
sense. 
16. I believe that the argument against Schauer is strongest in its "social power" version, but 
similar arguments could be constructed by someone who offered some other nonlinguistic source 
of constraint. 
17. Or, again, from some other nonlinguistic source. 
18. For my argument to hold, these communities must be linguistic: social power must de-
fine the language that community members use. For a discussion of Schauer's response to one 
version of this claim, see infra note 20. 
19. For an analysis that is, I believe, consistent with the lines of argument developed here, see 
Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 
823 (1991). 
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possibility. 20 
Schauer does show that the "social power" argument cannot be 
conducted on the level of individuals, but that, presumably, should go 
without saying. He may have been misled by a common rhetorical 
style, echoed in this review, of personalizing more general arguments 
(Susan and Sylvester, for example) rather than discussing - to be 
crude about it - the ruling class and the working class. Of course the 
question of social power, or nonlinguistic sources of semantic auton-
omy, arises only in connection with Susans and Sylvesters taken as 
aggregates. 
In two footnotes, Schauer notices the problem, but recasts it in a 
way that leads him away from a full discussion. "[N]othing I say," he 
writes, "denies the possibility of linguistic sub-communities within the 
community of English-speakers."21 But, he argues, "it is almost al-
ways the case that that technical language [of linguistic subcommuni-
ties] is parasitic on ordinary language" (p. 60 n.11). Finally, Schauer 
envisages an extension of the "technical sub-community" idea to "the 
possibility that every speech act environment is its own linguistic com-
munity" (p. 60) - that is, an extension to a completely individualistic 
form. 
I do not understand why the only relevant subcommunities are 
those that use technical language. Perhaps Schauer believes that lin-
guistic subcommunities cannot be constituted by social power because 
they must use ordinary language to get the process of becoming a sub-
community going, and that social power can have no relevance to the 
already constituted ordinary-language community of which the sub-
communities are already parts. Yet, the point about linguistic com-
munities that use technical language, which Schauer obviously 
understands, is that their uses are initially parasitic upon ordinary lan-
guage, but at some point split off. 
Now consider two potential linguistic subcommunities: Susan's 
and Sylvester's. Perhaps their language must be parasitic on ordinary 
language in the same way, but I do not understand why that must be 
so. If they are parasitic in different ways, as the subcommunities de-
20. Schauer addresses what he properly calls an implausible argument that "meaning is a 
function of how an item oflanguage is used on a particular occasion by a particular speaker." P. 
59. He says as well that it is another thing to argue that "the meaning of a word •.. is a function 
of how it is used by the community of speakers of a language." P. 59. A few pages later he 
discusses an important contemporary controversy among philosophers about how to understand 
Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following. Pp. 65·68. The dispute as Schauer presents it con· 
cems how "an unformulated or unformulatab/e rule" constrains; it does not concern "explaining 
the potential constraint ofa formulated rule." P. 67. As so understood, the dispute is not one on 
which Schauer must take a position. P. 65 n.23. Perhaps because I have misunderstood the 
philosophers' debates about Wittgenstein (and because I find one side of the argument more 
persuasive than the other), I think that Schauer does not confront the "social power" argument 
head on. 
21. P. 60 n.11; see also p. 58 n.8. 
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velop their understanding of their own terms, the distance from ordi-
nary language increases, but, more important for the present 
argument, so does their distance from each other. Sylvester's probable 
cause may be parasitic on ordinary language in one way, within a lin-
guistic subcommunity of police officers, while Susan's is parasitic on 
ordinary language in another way, within a different linguistic sub-
community. 22 If Sylvester nonetheless acts in a manner consistent 
with Susan's rule, Schauer has not eliminated - or, I am afraid, even 
addressed - the possibility that it is social power, rather than the 
rule's meaning, that constrains Sylvester. To capture my point in an 
oversimplified phrase: for "playing by the rules" to be a coherent 
practice, Sylvester must be different from Susan, but for rules to con-
strain because of their semantic autonomy, Sylvester must be part of 
the same linguistic community as Susan. 
Nothing in the nature of society makes it impossible for both parts 
of that phrase to be true. Nor, however, does anything in the nature of 
language make it necessary that they both be true. In short, Schauer's 
analytic exercise makes sense of the practice of rule-following, but it 
does not, because I believe it cannot, establish that rules constrain be-
cause of their semantic autonomy. I confess, though, that I do not 
really understand why that is so important anyway. 
Throughout the book Schauer illuminates a number of issues. For 
example, he explains why a legal system, considered as a set of rules, 
typically operates on the premises of "presumptive positivism" (pp. 
202-06). Yet, as far as I can tell, little in Schauer's analysis of these 
collateral issues turns on his particular view of the ruleness of rules; 
nothing changes, as far as I can see, if we confine our attention to rules 
considered as mere "rules of thumb." Presumptive positivism for 
Schauer is "a way of describing a degree of strong but overridable pri-
ority," so that "decision-makers override a rule ... not when they 
believe that the rule has produced an erroneous or suboptimal result in 
this case ... but instead when, and only when, the reasons for overrid-
ing are perceived by the decision-maker to be particularly strong" (p. 
204). But that also describes how an intelligent decisionmaker uses 
rules of thumb. Rules of thumb have presumptive force when deci-
sionmakers believe that they may be overlooking information that a 
more intensive but more expensive search would reveal. They there-
fore lack sufficient confidence in their judgment that the result in the 
case at hand is erroneous to override the rule of thumb, which encap-
sulates a range of experience with apparently similar cases. 
Schauer's collateral arguments are interesting, but obviously more 
important is his central point about the practice of rule-following. His 
analysis there is instructive, and may well be correct as a conceptual 
22. For example, Susan the judge may believe that probable means "more likely than not," 
while Sylvester the police officer may believe that it means "reasonably likely." 
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analysis. As I have suggested, however, its practical implications are 
less clear to me. Perhaps the analysis suggests that a police chief try-
ing to develop a rule about car chases should consider whether she is 
better than police officers at identifying and balancing the interests af-
fected by car chases. Yet, as I have suggested, I am reasonably confi-
dent that any chief who put the issue of formulating such a rule on her 
agenda would already have resolved that question. And, of course, 
Schauer agrees that once a rule is in place, his analysis does not tell 
anyone what to do with it. 
